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The Impact of Expanded Rules for Determining 
what Constitutes the "Same Offense" for Double 
Jeopardy Purposes: Illinois u. Vitale 
On November 20, 1974, a uniformed crossing guard mo- 
tioned for the school children to cross the street. Five-year-olds 
Carrilyn Christakos and George Kech started running across the 
streetneither reached the other side. Carrilyn was struck by an 
auto that skidded through the intersection. She was thrown 
eighty feet and died the following day. After being caught under 
the same auto and dragged fifty feet, George died almost 
instantly. 
The minor driver, John M. Vitale, was issued a traffic cita- 
tion for failing to reduce speed.' After waiving his right to a jury 
trail and pleading not guilty to the charge, Vitale was tried, 
found guilty, and fined fifteen  dollar^.^ The next day a petition 
for adjudication of wardship was filed in which Vitale was 
charged with involuntary manslaughter for the deaths of the two 
children? The petition was dismissed on Vitale's motion that 
the conviction and fine for failing to reduce speed precluded his 
again being placed in jeopardy for the same offense? 
The State of Illinois appealed and the Appellate Court of 
Illinois &med for reasons other than double je~pardy.~ On ap- 
1. Police Traffic Accident Report of the Department of Police, Village of South 
Holland, Illinois, reprinted in Brief and Argument for Petitioner, Appendix at 21-26, 
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980). 
2. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 411 (1980). 
3. The trial was held on December 23, 1974, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, 
Illionis. 447 U.S. at 412. The maximum punishment for failing to reduce speed to avoid 
an accident is 30 days in jail or a fine of five hundred dollars. Id. at 412 n.3; Illinois 
Vehicle Code 8 16-104, h. REV. STAT. ch. 95%, g 16-104(a) (1973); Unified Code of 
Corrections Qg 5-9-1, -8-3, ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 38, gg 1005-9-1, -8-3 (1973). 
4. The petition was filed in the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court of Cook 
County, Illinois. 447 U.S. at 412-13. Vitale was charged with two counts of involuntary 
manslaughter pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Code of 1961, ILL. REV. STAT. 
ch. 38, 8 9-3 (1973). 447 U.S. at 413 n.4. 
5. Specifically, the motion was based on the grounds that the prosecution was viola- 
tive of statutory and constitutional double jeopardy. The Juvenile Court did not reach 
the constitutional question. It held that the prosecution was prohibited by Illinois' com- 
pulsory joinder statute. 447 U.S. at 413-14 n.5. 
6. In re Vitale, 44 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1035-38, 358 N.E.2d 1288, 1292-93 (1976). The 
court afErmed based on Illinois' compulsory joinder requirements. 
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peal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the dismissal order was af- 
firmed on the basis of the "more compelling" grounds of the 
double jeopardy clause of the Federal Con~titution.~ 
After the Illinois Supreme Court certified that its decision 
was based on federal constitutional grounds, the United States 
Supreme Court granted ~ertiorari.~ The Court held that "[ilf, as 
a matter of Illinois law, a careless failure to slow is always a nec- 
essary element of manslaughter by automobile, then the two of- 
fenses are the 'same' . . . and Vitale's trial on the latter charges 
would constitute double jeopardy . . . ."e The Court then va- 
cated the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and remanded 
the case for clarification of Illinois law and a determination of 
what act or acts the state would rely upon to prove involuntary 
mamlaughter.1° 
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment states: 
"[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."I1 The proper under- 
standing and application of this clause depends upon what con- 
stitutes the "same offense.'' Although many approaches have 
been used to determine what constitutes the "same offense,"12 
the Court's current test was articulated in Brown u. Ohio.ls This 
test is a variation of the "same evidence" test that was first 
enunciated in The King v. Vandercomb & Abbott.14 The indict- 
ment in Vandercomb charged a nocturnal breaking followed by 
larceny. At trial it was discovered that the larceny had occurred 
the day before the nocturnal breaking. The rigid common-law 
pleading rules then applicable required that the defendants be 
acquitted because of this error in the order of the offenses. To 
correct this apparent miscarriage of justice, the court deeided 
that "unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might 
7. In re Vitale, 71 Ill. 2d 229, 235, 375 N.E.2d 87, 89 (1978). 
8. The State of Illinois petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari, which was granted on November 27,1978.447 U.S. at  415. In the order grant- 
ing the writ, the Court vacated the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and re- 
manded the case for a determination of whether the judgment was based on federal or 
state constitutional grounds. Id. On March 22,1979, the Illinois Supreme Court certified 
that its judgment was based on federal constitutional grounds. The Court again granted 
a writ of certiorari on October 1, 1979. Illinois v. Vitale, 444 U.S. 823 (1979). 
9. 447 U.S. at  419-20. This was a five-to-four decision. 
10. Id. at  421 
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
12. See 75 YALE L.J. 262, 267-77 (1965). 
13. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
14. 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (C.C.R. 1796). 
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have been convicted upon by proof of the facts contained in the 
second indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment can be 
no bar to the second."16 
A modified "same evidence" test was first applied in the 
United States in Morey u. Commonwealth.le In Morey a convic- 
tion for the sale of intoxicating liquors was held "to bar prosecu- 
tion for a single sale of such liquors within the same time, upon 
the ground that the lesser offense . . . is merged in the greater 
offense."17 The modified rule stated: "A single act may be an 
offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of 
an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or con- 
viction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from 
prosecution and punishment under the other."18 
The Morey version of the "same evidence" rule was adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Gavieres v. United States.lB This ver- 
sion was relied on when the Court recited the currently acknowl- 
edged rule in Blockburger v. United  state^.'^ The critical issue, 
as defined in Blockburger, is "whether each [statutory] provision 
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."'l 
In clarifying the Blockburger test, the Court in Brown v. 
OhioM stated that "the greater offense is . . . by definition the 
'same' for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense in- 
cluded in it."98 The Court added that "the sequence [of the 
greater and lesser offenses] ia irn~naterial."~~ 
The Brown Court also emphasized its role in the interpreta- 
tion of state law. Quoting from Garner u. Louisiana," it noted 
that the state courts "have final authority to interpret . . . that 
state's legislati~n."~~ The Court further pointed out that the 
freedom of the legislature to "define crimes and fix punish- 
ments" is unrestrained by the double jeopardy clause.27 Once the 
legislature has acted, "courts may not impose more than one 
-- -- -- pp -- 
15. Id. at 461. 
16. 108 Mass. 433 (1871). 
17. Id. at 435. 
18. Id. at 434. 
19. 220 US. 338, 342-43 (1911). 
20. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
21. Id. at 304. 
22. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
23. Id. at 168. 
24. Id. 
25. 368 US. 157 (1961). 
26. 432 U.S. at 167. 
27. Id. at 165. 
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punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may 
not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial."28 
Subsequent to Brown the "same evidence" test was applied 
in Harris v. Oklah~mcr.~@ The Harris Court held that robbery 
was a lesser-included offense of felony murder since " 'proof of 
the underlying felony [here robbery with firearms] is needed to 
prove the intent for a felony murder conviction.' The Court's 
next application of the "same evidence" test occured in the in- 
stant case. 
In the instant case the Court acknowledged Brown and its 
application of Blockburger as the "principal test" to determine 
what constitutes the "same offense" for double jeopardy." The 
Court recognized that application of the Blockburger test relies 
on the abstract proof necessary to establish the statutory ele- 
ments, rather than on the actual proof to be presented at trial.sa 
The Court also noted the Illinois Supreme Court's reliance on 
Brownss and acknowledged the propriety of the state supreme 
court defining the statutory elements of the two crimesY The 
Court was uncertain, however, whether the Illinois Supreme 
Court properly applied Brown to the facts in the instant case:' 
This uncertainty centered on the Court's determination that 
Brown requires a two-pronged test for the lesser-included of- 
f e n ~ e . ~ ~  The first prong is the traditional Blockburger test that 
requires that every element of the lesser-included offense also be 
an element of the greater offense.87 The second prong requires 
28. Id. 
29. 433 US. 682 (1977). 
30. Id. (bracketa in original) (quoting Harris v. State, 555 P.2d 76, 80-81 (Okla. 
1976)). 
31. 447 US. at  416. 
32. Id. 
33. The Court stated: "The Illinois court relied upon our holding in Brown v. Ohio, 
432 US. 161 (1977), that a conviction for a leeser-included offense precludes later prose- 
cution for the greater offense." Id. at  417. 
34. The Court conceded: "We accept, as we must, the Supreme Court of Illinois' 
identification of the elementa of the offenses involved here." Id. at  416. 
35. Id. at  416-19. 
36. The Court analyzed Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), as follows: "The Ohio 
courts had held that every element of the joyriding 'is also an element of the crime of 
auto theft,' . . . we also noted that 'the prowcutor who has established auto theft neces- 
sarily has established joyriding as well.' " 447 U.S. at  417. The Court continued its analy- 
sis by pointing out that "[bloth otmervations were essential to the Brown holding . . . if 
proof of the auto theft had not necegaarily involved proof of joyriding . . ." the offenses 
would not have been the same for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at  417. 
37. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 
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that the establishment of the greater offense necessarily estab- 
lish the lesser offense? 
The Court observed that the first prong was clearly met in 
the instant case:s but was uncertain whether the second prong 
was satisfied. In the Court's view the Illinois Supreme Court was 
"cryptic" in its analysis because it failed to address the conten- 
tion that under Illinois law the establishment of involuntary 
manslaughter by means of a motor vehicle necessarily estab- 
lishes the offense of failing to reduce speed.'O Although the 
Court recognized the role of the state supreme court in inter- 
preting Illinois law, it concluded that under Illinois law failing to 
reduce speed may not necessarily be established when involun- 
tary manslaughter by means of a motor vehicle is established. If 
it is not, the Blockburger test (as now defined with the two 
prongs) was not satisfied." 
The Court then offered another approach to double jeop- 
ardy protection. This new application of the Blockburger test fo- 
cused on the actual proof to be presented at trial rather than the 
abstract proof necessary to establish the statutory elements.4s 
Under this new approach the Court concluded that Vitale would 
have a "substantial" double jeopardy claim if the state plans to 
prove that failing to reduce speed is the reckless act required to 
establish the manslaughter offense? 
38. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 US. at 418. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. The Court stated: 
The Illinois Supreme Court did not expressly address the contentions that 
manslaughter by automobile could be proved without also proving a careless 
failure to reduce speed and we are reluctant to accept its rather cryptic re- 
marks about the relationship between the two offenses involved here as an au- 
thoritative holding that under Illinois law proof of manslaughter by automobile 
would always involve a careless failure to reduce speed to avoid a collision. 
Id. at 419. 
41. Id. at 419. 
42. This approach was presented after the Court had already arrived at its holding 
in the instant case. Id. at 420-21. It is different, however, from the approach taken in 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Referring to Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 
161 (1977), the Vitale Court noted: "We recognized that the Blockburger test focusee on 
the proof necessary to prove the statutory elements of each offense, rather than on the 
actual evidence to be presented at trial." 447 U.S. at  416 (emphasis added). 
43. As authority for this proposition the Court cited Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 
(1977) and Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977). 447 U.S. at 420. In Harris the Court 
"treated a killing in the course of a robbery as itself a separate statutory offense, and the 
robbery as a species of lesser-included offense." Id. After noting that "the state conceded 
that the robbery . . . was in fact the underlying felony, all elements of which h d  been 
proved in the murder prosecution," the Court concluded that the offenses were the 
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In ultimately deciding to vacate the judgment and remand 
the case to the Illinois Supreme Court, the Court emphasized 
two points.44 First, the Court was unable to determine whether 
under the Blockburger test the two offenses are the "same" for 
double jeopardy purposes because the relationship under Illinois 
law between the offenses of failing to reduce speed and involun- 
tary manslaughter by means of a motor vehicle was unclear. Sec- 
ondly, the Court was uncertain what actual proof would be used 
at trial to establish the offense of involuntary manslaughter by 
means of a motor vehicle.46 
The individual desire for justice might be satisfied by a de- 
cision that allows further prosecution of one who carelessly 
caused the deaths of two five-year-old children and whose only 
penalty was a fifteen dollar fine." The individual desire for jus- 
tice, however, must be tempered by the Court's duty to effect 
uniform justice and to provide sound precedent. 
In the instant case, the Court's opinion fails to balance the 
individual desire for justice with the far-reaching impact of the 
decision. Without addressing the impact of its opinion, the 
Court severely limited the constitutional guarantees against 
double jeopardy. The extension of Brown limited these guaran- 
tees in three ways. First, the Court expanded the traditional 
Blockburger test by adding a second prong that severely narrows 
the category of offenses that may be considered the "same" for 
double jeopardy purposes. Secondly, the Court developed an al- 
ternative approach for determining the "same offense." The new 
approach relies on the actual proof to be presented at  trial 
rather than the abstract proof required to establish the statutory 
elements. This approach complicates the "same offense" deter- 
mination when the lesser offense is prosecuted first. Finally, the 
Court arguably involved itself in interpretation of state law for 
double jeopardy purposes. Traditionally, the Court has left in- 
terpretation of state law in this area to the state legislature and 
state courts. 
"same" for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 420-21 (emphasis added). 
44. 447 U.S. at 421. 
45. Id. 
46. This fine was not the maximum punishment allowed by law. The maximum pun- 
ishment allowed is 30 days in jail or a h e  of five hundred dollars. 
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Adding a Second Prong to the Traditional Blockburger Test 
The Court's decision in Brown clearly established the ac- 
ceptance of the traditional Blockburger test: "The applicable 
rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a viola- 
tion of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether 
each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does 
not."4v The key word in the traditional Blockburger test is "re- 
quires." The Court in Gavieres v. United s t a t e ~ ' ~  illustrated the 
importance of the word "requires" by applying statutory re- 
quirements to find that two offenses were not the "same" for 
double jeopardy purposes. One of the offenses required proof 
that the conduct occurred in a public place, but did not necessa- 
rily require proof that a public official was insulted. The other 
offense required proof that a public official was insulted, but did 
not necessarily require proof that he was insulted in a public 
place. The offenses were determined not to be the "same" since 
each statute required proof that the other did not.'@ 
In the instant case the Blockburger test, which is based on 
Gavieres, seemingly mandates a determination that the offenses 
are the "same" for double jeopardy purposes. Although Vitale 
could have been reckless in ways other than failing to reduce 
speedy the statute does not require that the reckless action be 
something different from failing to reduce speed. Motor vehicle 
statutes only require that a reckless act occur in the operation of 
a motor vehicle for involuntary manslaughter to be e~tablished.~' 
Clearly, failure to reduce speed is a lesser-included offense of in- 
voluntary manslaughter by a motor vehicle under the traditional 
Blockburger test. 
The Court, however, was apparently not satisfied in the in- 
stant case with the result obtained by application of the tradi- 
tional Blockburger test. The Court, to arrive at the desired re- 
sult, interpreted Brown as adding a second prong to the 
47. 432 U.S. 161, 166 (19'77) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 
304 (1932)) (emphasii added). 
48. 220 U.S. 338 (1911). 
49. Id. at 342. 
50. See 441 U.S. at 419. 
51. Involuntary manslaughter by means of a motor vehicle requires among other 
things that "the ads which cause the death consist of the driving of a motor vehicle" and 
that the driver "performs them recklessly." Criminal Code of 1961, ICL. REV. STAT. ch. 
38, 5 9-3 (1973). 
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traditional test. This second prong requires that proof of the 
greater offense will necessarily establish the lesser offense.s2 
Waller v. Floridass illustrates the extent to which the 
Court's application of this two-pronged test varies from its ap- 
plication of the traditional Blockburger test in pre-Brown deci- 
sions. The petitioner in Waller was convicted of destruction of 
city property and was later charged with grand larceny. The 
Court considered the offenses the "same," and thus the trial for 
grand larceny was prohibited on double jeopardy g r o ~ n d s . ~  In-
terestingly, the Court accepted the assumption that the destruc- 
tion of city property was a lesser-included offense of grand lar- 
ceny." Acceptance of this assumption under the traditional 
Blockburger test raises no questions. Under the new test, how- 
ever, acceptance of this assumption would mean that the Court 
would either conclude that the offenses were not the "same" or 
acknowledge that a conviction for grand larceny would also nec- 
essarily establish the lesser offense of destruction of city 
property. 
Application of this second prong in the instant case led the 
Court to the conclusion that a failure to reduce speed is not a 
lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter by means of 
a motor veh i~ l e ;~  thus, the state was allowed to prosecute Vitale 
on the charge of involuntary manslaughter. Although this con- 
clusion may satisfy an individual's narrow concept of justice in 
the instant case, it is inconsistent with the Court's previous deci- 
sion in Harris v. Oklah~ma.~~  
Harris was decided per curium subsequent to the Brown de- 
cision. In Harris, the Court found that robbery was a lesser-in- 
cluded offense of felony-murder? The decision, on its face, con- 
tradicts the second prong of the test applied in the instant case. 
Felony-murder under Oklahoma law could be established by 
proof of any underlying felony, not just robbery.6@ Applying the 
second prong, however, would require that robbery would have 
to necessarily be established when felony-murder is proven. 
The Vitale Court sidestepped this inconsistency in it3 anal- 
447 U.S. at 418. 
397 U.S. 387 (1970). 
Id. at 394-95. 
Id. at 390. 
See 447 U.S. at 419. 
433 U.S. 682 (1977). 
Id. 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 5 701(3) (1971). 
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ysis of Harris by making two significant changes from Brown. 
First, the Court involved itself in the interpretation of state law. 
The Oklahoma'law upon which Harris was decided stated that 
homicide is murder " [wlhen perpetrated without any design to 
effect death by a person engaged in the commission of any fel- 
ony."" The Court used its own definition of Oklahoma law to 
make Harris consistent with the application of the second prong 
in the instant case. In describing this redefinition the Court 
stated: "[Wle treated a killing in the course of a robbery as itself 
a separate statutory offense, and robbery as itself a species of 
lesser-included offense?' Although this redefinition was neces- 
sary for consistency with the second prong of the test, it never- 
theless marked a significant change from the traditional ap- 
proach of leaving definition of state law to the state.62 
Secondly, the Court used actual proof presented at trial 
rather than the proof needed to establish the statutory elements 
in the abstract to analyze Harris. Under the traditional applica- 
tion of the Blockburger test, the Court would have analyzed 
Harris by looking to the proof required to meet the abstract 
statutory elements of the offense.6s The Court instead justified 
its decision that the offenses were the "same" on the ground 
"[tlhe State conceded that the robbery for which petitioner had 
been indicted was in fact the underlying felony, all elements of 
which had been proved in the murder prose~ut ion. '~ Although 
this use of actual proof supported the Court's finding that the 
offense was the "same" under the second prong, the use of such 
proof is contrary to the application of the Blockburger test as 
explained in Brown.66 
The result in the instant case clearly demonstrates that the 
addition of the second prong to the test has severely narrowed 
the category of offenses that may be considered the "same" for 
double jeopardy purposes. For example, under the second prong, 
offenses such as felony-murder will never have lesser-included 
offenses. Since more than one underlying felony can be used to 
prove felony-murder, no particular underlying felony would be 
60. Id. (emphasis added). 
61. 447 U.S. at 420. 
62. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167 (1977) (quoting Garner v. Louisiana, 368 
U.S. 157, 169 (1961)). 
63. See 447 U.S. at 416. 
64. Id. at 420-21 (emphasis added). 
65. Id. at 416: In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977), the test is "whether each 
[statutory] provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not . . . ." 
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"necessarily" established when a felony-murder is proved. Al- 
though this narrowing of double jeopardy protection is ex- 
tremely important, the Court's opinion does not discuss the 
matter? 
Use of Actual Proof to be Presented at Trial 
In its analysis of Harris the Court developed a new ap- 
proach that focused on the actual evidence to be presented at 
trial. The offenses were determined to be the "same" since "all 
elements [of the robbery] . . . had been proved in the murder 
pr~secution."~~ This approach differs from the traditional Block- 
burger test that "focuses on the proof necessary to prove the 
statutory elements of each offense, rather than the actual evi- 
dence to be presented at trial."m Although the Court was willing 
to modify the traditional Blockburger test, its opinion unfortu- 
nately did not address the weaknesses of this new approa~h.~@ 
A primary weakness in the approach is that whereas the ab- 
stract statutory elements of an offense are definable with some 
certainty before the case is prosecuted, the actual evidence to be 
presented at trial is uncertain.70 The statutory elements of the 
66. This narrowing could be avoided by redefining all offenses such as felony-mur- 
der so that they are composed of one and only one underlying offense. Thus, a general 
felony-murder statute could be replaced by separate statutes for rape-murder, robbery- 
murder, burglary-murder, and so forth. The redefinition of such offenses would necessa- 
rily be comprehensive rather than selective in its scope, otherwise the second prong 
could still lead to arbitrary application of double jeopardy protections. 
67. 447 U.S. at 420-21. 
68. Id. at 416. 
69. The dissenting opinion in the instant case exposed one weakness of this new 
approach: 
Throughout the five years that this case has been in litigation, the State 
has apparently not seen fit to reveal the basis of ita homicide prosecution. The 
Court does not view this omission as an important one. On the contrary, its 
opinion implies that the State may proceed to trial before a determination is 
made on [Vitale's] double jeopardy claim. But surely such a procedure is in- 
consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause, which was specifically designed to 
protect the citizen from multiple trials. 
. . . Since the State has not provided [Vitale] with notice of any basis for 
prosecution that does not depend on proving, for the second time, a careless 
failure to reduce speed, I would not require [Vitale] to stand trial again." 
Id. at 426-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
70. The Court observed that "the reckless act or acts the State will rely on to prove 
the manslaughter are still unknown . . . ." Id. at 421. Note that the instant case was 
decided June 19, 1980. The petition for adjudication of wardship based on the involun- 
tary manslaughter charge was filed December 24, 1974. Although the petition was fled 
over five years before this case was decided, the state had not made known to Vitale the 
reckl;' act or acts that it would rely on to support the involuntary manslaughter charge. 
958 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
offense are not controlled by either of the parties involved in the 
action. The actual evidence presented at trial is, on the other 
hand, subject to the prosecutor's discretion. 
Total certainty as to what will be presented at trial is not 
possible until trial. If the Court requires total certainty, the new 
approach will only be useable in cases where the greater offense 
is prosecuted before the lesser offense. When the lesser offense is 
prosecuted first, for example, one of the several alternative ele- 
ments of the greater offense may be proved without any indica- 
tion of which of these alternative elements will be presented to 
prove the greater offense. If, on the other hand, the Court will 
accept less than total certainty, standards must be developed to 
determine before the fact what is to be presented in the prosecu- 
tion. Along with these standards sanctions must be provided to 
ensure that the standards are followed. These standards must 
not be so cumbersome that compliance with them will defeat the 
value of the double jeopardy guarantees. For example, if compli- 
ance in effect compels the defendant to substantially prepare for 
trial, he will have already lost those rights that the double jeop- 
ardy clause was intended to protect.'' 
The Court's decision not only imposes substantial and ex- 
pensive pre-trial preparation on the defendant, it also erodes the 
policies underlying double jeopardy protection in other ways. 
The purpose of the double jeopardy prohibition is to prevent 
"the state with all its resources and power" from subjecting the 
individual "to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel- 
ling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity 
. . . ."" By neither knowing whether the state would prosecute 
nor what evidence its case would rest on, Vitale and others in 
similar situations suffer embarrassment, anxiety, and insecurity 
along with the expense and ordeal of a second prosecution. 
The dissent contended that this failure to timely apprise Vitale of the prosecution 
theory should bar the second trial. Id. at 423. 
71. "The specific purposes of the [double jeopardy] protection are the avoidance of 
unnecessary harrassment, the avoidance of social stigma, the economy of time and 
money, and the interest in psychological security." J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 156 
(1969). 
72. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). 
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The Role of the United States Supreme Court in Defining 
State Law for Double Jeopardy Purposes 
In Garner u. LouisianaTs the Court expressed its position on 
the role of state courts in the interpretation of state law. The 
Court recognized "that Louisiana courts have the final authority 
to interpret and, where they see fit, to reinterpret that state's 
legi~lation."~~ Accordingly, the Court was reluctant to interfere 
with a state court's settled interpretation of Louisiana law.?' 
This traditional reluctance was reiterated in Brown. After 
paraphrasing the above quote from Garner, the Court stated 
that "the Ohio Court of Appeals has authoritatively defined the 
elements of the two Ohio crimes . . . Based on the state 
court's authoritative definition of Ohio law, the Court applied 
the traditional Blockburger test. The Court's discussion of the 
effect a different definition of Ohio law would have had on the 
decision further illustrates its reluctance to deviate from its 
traditional role. The Court emphasized that either the legisla- 
ture could have written the law differently or the state courts 
could have construed the law differently. Specifically, the Court 
stated that the state would have prevailed if the legislature had 
worded the Ohio statute or the state courts had interpreted it to 
make joyriding "a separate offense for each day in which a mo- 
tor vehicle is operated without the owner's consent."77 The 
Court, however, refrained from making that interpretation itself. 
By contrast, in the instant case the Court did interpret state 
law as it analyzed Harris? In applying the second prong of the 
test the Court wrote: 
The Oklahoma felony murder statute on its face did not re- 
quire proof of a robbery to establish felony murder; other felo- 
nies could underlie a felony murder prosecution. But for the 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, we did not consider a 
crime generally described as felony murder as a separate of- 
fense distinct from its various elements. Rather, we treated a 
killing in the course of a robbery as itself a separate statutory 
offense, and the robbery as a species of lesser-included 
73. 368 U.S. 157 (1961). 
74. Id. at 169 (emphasis added). 
75. Id. 
76. 432 U.S. 161, 167 (1977). 
77. Id. at 169-70 n.8. The Ohio state courts had never interpreted joyriding as a 
separate offense for each day. 
78. See 447 U.S. at 420. 
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The Court's departure from its traditional approach was re- 
quired to harmonize its application of the second prong of the 
test in Harris with the instant case. The Court's unprincipled 
departure from precedent raises the question of what role the 
Court will play in the future in the interpretation of state law. 
Traditionally, interpretation of state law has been based on an 
analysis of legislative history and a review of pertinent state 
court decisions. These state court decisions have applied state 
law in a variety of settings, not just the double jeopardy context. 
The Court's consideration of these laws as they relate only to 
double jeopardy claims will necessarily be less extensive than 
the traditional approaches that state legislatures and state 
courts have taken. Additionally, there is concern that the Court 
may, as it has done in the instant case, change its established 
rules and look principally at the apparent justice of the case 
before it. Such an approach would diminish the important pro- 
tections that the double jeopardy clause currently guarantees. 
Prior to Vitale the United States Supreme Court consist- 
ently applied the well settled Blockburger test for determining 
what is the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. Con- 
cerned, apparently, with the outcome that the traditional Block- 
burger test would have mandated in the instant case, the Court 
drastically modified the Blockburger test and its application. 
The traditional test considers offenses the "same" when the 
lesser offense does not require proof of any facts in addition to 
those required to establish the greater offense. The modified test 
considers offenses the "same" only when the lesser offense must 
necessarily be established when the greater offense is estab- 
lished. This modification narrows the number of offenses that 
will be considered the "same" by the Court. 
Traditionally, the test was applied by leaving to the state 
the definition of the statutory elements of the offenses. In the 
instant case the Court modified this approach by defining the 
statutory elements itself. The Court also modified the tradi- 
tional approach by considering the actual proof to be presented 
at trial to establish the offense, rather than the abstract proof 
necessary to prove the statutory elements. These approach mod- 
ifications allow the Court to be arbitrary in what statutory ele- 
ments will be considered. Additionally, the defendant may lose 
79. Id. 
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important double jeopardy protection simply because he is un- 
sure as to what actual proof will be presented at trial and thus 
whether or not the prosecution will be barred on double jeop- 
ardy grounds. 
The Court should retreat to the traditional Blockburger test 
and its application in order to keep intact our important double 
jeopardy guarantees. 
David G. Harlow 
